Toward an Exchange Theory of Revolution

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Today's student of revolution faces the same riddle posed by Tolstoy a century ago in *War and Peace.* "Napoleon commanded an army to be raised," wrote Tolstoy, "and to march out to war." The riddle thus is, "why six hundred thousand men go out to fight when Napoleon utters certain words." Why, when revolutionary leaders utter certain words, do men march off to their death? In Vietnam, conversely, when President Diem ordered his army to go off to fight, why did it not do so? Or, to pose the same riddle in more contemporary terms, what must the aspiring political leader do to "make power"?

Each of these situations is an instance of the same empirical and conceptual difficulty: how one can gain "something for nothing," i.e., create influence relationships where none existed before, and with no material resources. The solution proposed here seizes upon a salient structural similarity between the empirical development of a revolutionary movement and the sociological concept of an "emergent structure."[1] This concept, coined to warn against the fallacy of psychological reductionism in the study of group behavior, denotes new patterns of behavior that appear when individuals interact. For us it is pregnant with implications for the emergence of revolutionary movements.

What follows is an attempt to go beyond the conceptualization of revolution set forth in my book *War Comes to Long An.*[2] The analysis there was limited in two important respects. First, it was a static theory rather than one incorporating explicitly dynamic variables. Second, it was inadequate to cope with what I call the genetic problem: the actual process by which individuals in an environment of

favorable disposing conditions become "one" in a coherent organization.

Social exchange theory and the concept of "emergent structure" have much to tell us about the fine structure of group processes that lead to the development of revolutionary movements. A knowledge of this fine structure will help us to avoid some errors and oversimplifications in dealing with gross phenomena and to see relationships that may not be evident from an examination of macrostructures alone. In particular the use of social exchange theory can offer us important insights into the processes occurring between various components within a revolutionary movement, and between the movement and its ecological and human environments. Furthermore, we will be better able to avoid the ambiguities of such terms as mobilization, participation, support, and nationalism. The conceptualization proposed here will also, I believe, move us beyond such explanations of revolution as "grievances," "fanaticism," and "roboticism" (i.e., organizational theories). The perspective of revolution that comes into view is instead one of revolutionary participation as an adaptive response to changing circumstances.

In what follows the reader may be struck by the similarities between the predictions of exchange theory and the dictates of common sense. This much should be reassuring. However, the reader may also be tempted to ask what exchange theory *adds* to common sense. I think several observations can be made. First, this analytic structure formalizes many intuitive but vague notions, so that they may be operationalized. Second, it provides a series of bridging propositions to link static theories of individual and group behavior with dynamic theories of political and economic change. Third, it provides a means of integrating the role of group values with the role of incentives in organizational development. There is finally the awkward fact that, for all its similarities to common sense, nothing like exchange theory was used by official American analysts and policy makers in their analyses of and attempts to put down social revolution in Vietnam. Thus we may say that, to the extent exchange theory resembles common sense, it did not seem very compelling to those for whom Vietnam was an affair of state and not just an intellectual exercise.

The emphasis here is principally theoretical. In the first part the theory will be elaborated using examples and empirical data from Vietnam. The penultimate section will shift our attention to northern

Thailand, which, just because it is so different, well illustrates some important similarities. Finally, some unresolved problems and some fruitful topics for further research are suggested.

An Exchange Analysis of Revolution

In *War Comes to Long An* I attributed the strength of the revolutionary movement in Long An province to proper "policies," but this is inadequate as an explanation of revolutionary emergence. "Policies" imply the existence of a functioning "organization" that can "promulgate" them and (in the earlier formulation) motivate cooperation. Motivating cooperation is still germane, but the use of exchange theory permits us to move back a step to explore the conditions of emergence.

A brief review of the concept of emergence in the context of organization theory will serve as the introduction to our problem. For our purposes a revolutionary movement may most fruitfully be viewed as a cooperative system. At the same time, as a formal organization, it includes an authority structure, i.e., a structure in which participants execute orders because they feel it is right to do so, despite individual preferences to the contrary. Both components—voluntary cooperation and authoritative coordination—are present, and our specific question is how such a cooperative-authoritative structure comes into being where none existed before.

We will recapitulate here the theoretical account of this process given in a standard work in the field of organization theory, *Formal Organizations*, by Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott.[3] Blau and Scott describe authority relations as beginning in dyadic relations of compliance. Authority may develop out of the expansion of dyads into one structure headed by the same individual:

> To establish authority over his subordinates, the supervisor must be able and willing to furnish services that command their respect and allegiance. For the collective loyalty of subordinates is what legitimates his exercise of control over them and transforms it into authority. When respect for the supervisor and feelings of obligation to him prevail in a group, they give rise to a consensus that, since it is in the common interest to maintain his good will, his directives and requests must be followed. Once these group norms enforce compliance with the supervisor's directives, his influence becomes independent of the use of coercive sanctions, or of persuasion, or even of the need to oblige particular subordinates in exchange for every request made of them.[4]

Several features stand out here for our purposes. First, an "authority structure" emerges from the formation of a group where previously no group relations existed (i.e., where there were no common norms). Second, one basis for the initial dyadic compliant (cooperative) behavior was the furnishing of services by the supervisor, which we will pursue below as "exchange." Third, both voluntary (dyadic) compliance and subordination to authority exist in the group structure. Here we introduce an important postulate, namely, that the collective compliance will be greater the greater the extent of the exchange. Though such compliance might in fact continue in the absence of exchange because of the *individual* expectation of group members that all others would participate contrary to individual preferences, we postulate that this type of compliance will be less stable than compliance accompanied by continued exchange.

Our examination of the logic of this postulate will be facilitated by an extract from a later work by Blau, in which exchange as a "starting mechanism" is explicitly combined with the concept of emergence.

The social norms and values of subordinates that legitimate the power of influence of a superior transform it into authority. Simultaneously, indirect processes of social exchange become substituted for the direct exchange transactions between the superior and individual subordinates. Before legitimating norms have developed, subordinates offer compliance with the superior's directive in exchange for services he furnishes. . . . The emergent social norms that legitimate authority give rise to two exchange processes that take the place of this one. Individual subordinates submit to the authority of the superior because group norms require them to do so and failure to conform evokes social disapproval. The individual exchanges compliance with the directives of the superior for social approval from his peers. The collectivity of subordinates exchanges prevailing compliance with the superior's orders, which it has to offer as the result of its social norms that enforce compliance, and which legitimates the superior's authority, for the contribution to the common welfare his leadership furnishes.[5]

From this account we may extract the diagrams in Fig. 1, clarifying both the role of exchange and the emergent structure.

In this conceptualization an emergent authority structure arises from, and is perpetuated by, exchange processes. The first formal statement of exchange theory in sociology was by George Homans.

Fig. 1. *Above:* Initial dyadic relationship. *Below:* Authority relationship (emergent structure)

However, Chester Barnard's classic study of business organization employed exchange analysis implicitly, and as Alvin Gouldner has pointed out, assumptions about the primacy of exchange processes have an extremely long tradition. The most extensive and rigorous use of exchange analysis is now in economics, but some writers have begun to develop frameworks for its application to sociology. Exchange theory has thus far found very limited use in political science and, to my knowledge, none in the study of revolution.[6]

With exchange theory we can explain the development of one kind of social bond between individuals and, as we have seen above, the subsequent emergence of new group structures. Such social bonds develop since each party exchanges something less valued (by him) for something more valued. However, we can go beyond the framework of exchange theory developed thus far, in which two parties exchange values they already possess. The development of a revolutionary movement is more complex than this, precisely because the participants have "nothing" to start with except their own two hands and the extremely limited resources of those at the bottom of the social order. Whence the rewards that motivate cooperation? We should first clarify that what is *exchanged* is certain behaviors (or promises, i.e., agreements, to perform them). Two kinds of rewards then follow (though a third type will be discussed later). First, there are existing material resources, which may be redistributed through the "power" of the resulting authority structure.* Second, the emer-

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* At a more sophisticated level, however, we should note that "ownership," for example of real estate, is not an intrinsic property but just another form of generalized agreement. This is clear from the legal definition of ownership as an ensemble of state-protected rights, which may be disaggregated in practice as well as in theory.

gence of a *new* structure of coordinated action creates new values. This deserves a bit of elaboration. For one thing, such a new structure, having a hierarchy of status, will *ipso facto* provide new status roles, at least with reference to the organization's members. For another, individuals in a cooperative relationship with one another have a different impact on surrounding structures than would the same individuals not in cooperation. Thus cooperation, which each individual promises to the others, leads to an "emergent structure," new influence relations, and thereby new "power" and new "power roles." Putting this into diagram form so as to distinguish it from the Blau concept presented in Fig. 1, we have the configurations shown in Fig. 2.

Thus the "promises made" are motivated by rewards, some redistributive of existing values and some resulting from the new values created by these promises. To review a bit, once an organization exists, person *A* receives value from person *B* for compliance with *B*'s wish. This much is clear and not at issue (though, as an analysis of the functioning of organizations, it was poorly understood by the Saigon government). The genetic problem is rather how, with both


Fig. 2. *Above:* Structure prior to exchange relations. *Below:* Emergent structure secures rewards from environment.

A and *B* possessing practically "nothing," they can get "something." The answer can be clarified with some mathematical notation. If in the absence of cooperation *A* has accrued values totaling X_{a1} and *B* has accrued X_{b1}, and if they can have X_{a2} and X_{b2}, respectively, with coordinated action, where $X_{a2} > X_{a1}$ and $X_{b2} > X_{b1}$, then there is an incentive to both to achieve cooperation. This in a nutshell is the answer to the dilemma of the revolutionary seeking to create forces and of the political leader seeking to "make power." Through such an exchange process all are better off, or, in economic language, all move to a higher indifference curve.

From this conceptualization the following observation can be made about the "power" a cooperative system will "have": we identify this "power" with the amount of effort participants are willing to expend to maintain the exchange relationship. In our notation, it is the effort equivalent of the difference in value position before and after cooperation, i.e., $X_{a2} - X_{a1}$, $X_{b2} - X_{b1}$, summed over all the participants. This identification should create no conceptual problems as long as we understand power not as a generic term, but simply as the aggregate of all the specific behaviors participants are motivated to perform. This interpretation of power is different from Blau's, which identifies power with the relationship between individuals that holds when there is an imbalance of resources.[7] The difficulty with this interpretation is that, as we have shown, it is possible for an organization to "have power" though it begins with practically no resources at all.

A major conclusion from this analysis, and an analogy with economics, is that if various conditions discussed below are present, there can be an enormous expansion of cooperative activity and thus of "power" in the system. That is, new structures of influence may emerge, just as new wealth may be created in the economy.[8] Conversely, like the economy, the system may stagnate at low levels of power if participants are not willing to make the exchanges that permit an enlarged cooperative system to emerge.

Expanding on this insight a bit, cooperative systems do not evolve at random. They are shaped by what we may call constraining factors, that is, those factors that determine which out of all possible states is actually realized. Exchange analysis focuses our attention on the following:

1. *The objective situation.* By this is meant components both of

the physical world and of the existing social structure that make exchange attractive (e.g., population density; productivity; terrain configuration; a perceived threat; distribution of status, wealth, and income; and so forth).

2. *Values.* By this is meant those prerational beliefs about what is right that establish limits on permissible maximizing behavior. (Thus many actions that would enhance the value position of an individual in fact are not performed; we need not peer very far into human behavior to take this as given.) Particularly in regard to politics, this category subsumes "ideology," or the goal- and means-defining part of the belief structure. Values (in this sense) delimit the scope within which the exchanges specified by 3 and 4 may take place.

3. *Policies.* These are the rational, maximizing component. For the organizational context, policies define the terms of trade of an exchange; that is, they represent a statement of the kind of exchange the "organization" is willing to make. They are thus in some sense an "offer" to trade. (We should note that the actual exchange, when fully decomposed, might consist of numerous policies. Thus, within an administrative bureaucracy, the government's terms of trade are composed of policies of salary, promotion, and fringe benefits, and policies regarding degree of effort expected. Owing to the composite nature of the exchange, the structure of the situation may not be apparent.)

4. *Preferences.* This refers to a component of the psychology of the individual potential cooperators that defines (a) the ordering of the various values they desire; and (b) the intensity of that desire, i.e., the amount of effort the individual is willing to expend to obtain the value.

Looking back now over these four factors, we see that each one specifies an indefinite number of possible structures of cooperation. As each additional constraining factor is overlaid on those previously considered, the number of possible cooperative structures diminishes. In the relatively short run, which we will consider here (secular changes are treated further on), factors 1, 2, and 4 are constants, with factor 3 being the proximate determinant of which cooperative structure—*if any*—emerges in a particular instance. It is important to note that unless the potential structures permitted by each of the four factors are isomorphic for at least one structure, *none may emerge*. The empirical interpretation of this phenomenon is exem-

plified by the performance of numerous "paper" organizations in southern Vietnam during the Diem period.

Values and Preferences

At this point we will expand our discussion of factors 2 and 4 above. The use of exchange theory presupposes some kind of maximizing behavior by individuals, i.e., the social equivalent of "economic man": search behavior that will move the individual to a higher indifference curve. Yet men do not do this indiscriminately: they do not pursue some exchanges that would move them to a higher indifference curve. We may accordingly introduce a variable that determines the probability of an exchange on a given issue. This variable thus is an index for the facilitation or blockage of an exchange. Here we go a bit beyond Blau, who views values as integrative mechanisms for large numbers of individuals who do not know each other personally.[9] Instead we view values as the releasing *or inhibiting* factor.

There are many vague political terms in the literature regarding this phenomenon, for example, legitimacy and alienation. We propose to subsume these under the value variable and define it operationally as follows: holding incentives constant, the value coefficient is measured by the quantity of exchange (empirically this might be measured as the number of man-hours of a given level of effort motivated, or some similar quantity).

We must distinguish a second variable that comes into play: individual preferences. Values are here meant to denote the effect determined by *group* structure. Preferences are meant to denote the effect determined by individual personality structure. Though the two operate jointly to determine the extent of exchange on a given issue, they are distinct both empirically and conceptually.[10]

With this conceptualization we can now identify one component (the means component) of political ideology as the set of coefficients attached to each possible type of exchange. This will be useful below in explaining a major anomaly of the Saigon government's response to revolution: that it did not offer certain exchanges which would clearly have been in its own interest. One consequence of the relative consistency of social values is that they permit stability in complex systems of indirect exchange. Yet here, as we will see, a perverse consequence also occurred: the prerational limitation of flexibility in government response.

Policies

As noted above, I feel that a revolutionary movement may most fruitfully be conceptualized as a successful cooperative system, which neatly solves the genetic problem. Viewing revolution in this way also permits us to incorporate many diverse lines of inquiry, as we will attempt to do further on. Nevertheless, the theoretical exposition is not enough; there remains the question of what the actual exchanges might be.

Plainly, the first question is, who are the parties to the exchange? At one level it is clearly a question of "leaders" versus "followers" within an organization. Numerous observers have noted that revolutions are not made by peasants alone, for various excellent reasons such as limited cognitive competence and a non-futuristic orientation. Thus there is, at this level, an exchange (in the organizational division of labor) of leadership, insight, and "vision" on the part of superiors for compliance on the part of subordinates. Even if there were complete *formal* equality in the founding of a revolutionary organization (e.g., in a village), stratification would still occur because of differences in individual capacities and contributions.[11]

A second way to view exchange is to aggregate individuals into groups and see the exchange as taking place between one clearly corporate entity, e.g., a government (or, alternatively, a revolutionary movement), and various social groups whose members behave similarly, e.g., different classes of peasants, intellectuals, or small merchants.

What then, empirically, were the actual exchanges that took place in Vietnam and aided the success of the revolutionary movement; or, alternatively, what were the exchanges that failed to take place and weakened the government? As noted earlier, we tend to think of the terms of trade of an exchange as being set by "policies." But though we may unambiguously use the term policy to denote a course of action pursued by an existing organization, this usage is meaningless for an organization that does not yet exist: the exact problem of an emergent structure. For this special instance, then, I use the term policy to denote a *promised* course of action, which is actualized as the incipient cooperative structure emerges. Thus the exchange, as described earlier, is mutual agreement to perform specified activities, as a consequence of which the parties jointly will enjoy the future rewards.

We can identify several important policy differences (in this sense) between the revolutionary movement in Vietnam and the Saigon government. Furthermore, since the factors of objective situation, social values, and individual preference-orderings were relatively constant, whereas these policy differences were subject to human discretion, we may identify these policy differences as the final determinant of the differing organizational performances in Vietnam.

One set of policies were those pertaining to wealth and income. As I have pointed out in *War Comes to Long An*, the revolutionary land policy not only was able to achieve a far broader distribution of land than did the government program, but also was coupled with policies aimed at redistributing income between social groups: progressive (versus regressive) taxation, rent and interest reduction, and reduction in amounts charged for use of agricultural animals and implements.

The redistribution of wealth and income assumes a fixed amount of both. By the process described above, an emergent structure of cooperative activity might direct to its members some larger proportion of each. This could be done in Vietnam without harmful consequences for production since landlords had ceased playing a significant role in the production process.[12] No *addition* to either wealth or income was necessary—through some "development policy," for instance—for the revolutionary movement to succeed in inspiring voluntary cooperation in its effort. This constant volume of values did not hold regarding a second category of policies, those concerned with the distribution of power and status.

To a limited extent the revolutionary movement's policies of redistribution of power could be said to be identical in structure to those regarding wealth and income: simply dividing a fixed quantity differently, or in this case installing different persons in positions similar to those previously occupied by government personnel. However, this simple redistribution of power roles to different social groups, interesting as it is, was not the actual structure of revolutionary success. The movement did more than redistribute roles: it permitted *new structures of cooperation* to emerge, through the process I described earlier. It is here that the use of policies in the sense of agreements is most clearly distinguished. Here, also, the sense is clear of an exchange between the government (or the revolutionary movement) and social groups.

What did the Party do that permitted these new structures to

emerge? Several contributing factors can be identified. First, the Party "placed more authority" at lower levels in its organization than the government did. It is important not to reify authority; it is not something "given." Rather, the Communist leadership adopted different policies from those of the government concerning which levels would be permitted to make certain types of decisions. Thus, organizational roles at the lowest levels in the revolutionary structure specifically called for the making of more important decisions than could be made by the corresponding government echelon. At the same time, the policy of decentralizing some decision-making was matched by the "policy" of demanding more risk-taking and effort. Government leaders were not willing to agree to such decision-making authority at these levels, and so were not able to receive the risk-taking and expenditure of effort in exchange.

A second contributing factor was the contrasting promotional structures of the revolutionary movement and the Saigon government, as shown in Fig. 3. Within the revolutionary movement there was a continuous promotion system from the village Party chapter to the Central Committee, the recruiting at the bottom being done principally from among groups of low rank in the stratification order. In contrast, the government continued the system established at the turn of the century, recruiting rural elites only into the village-canton structure, and relying on a completely different career system for positions in the central administrative structure. There was no mobility path from the one to the other.

We may analyze this structural difference from an individual view-

Fig. 3. Contrasting mobility structures

point and see that no matter how hard a government village chief worked, he could never hope to be more than a canton chief, whereas within the Party a poor peasant could aspire to a position at the village level, the district level, or even higher. Thus the Party policy of a continuous promotion system (in effect a social mobility mechanism) was actually one-half of an exchange, the other half being the comparatively greater risk-taking and effort demanded, and produced, within the revolutionary system. This promotion system had an independent structural effect, although it was combined in practice with a class-sorting mechanism (at least until 1945, when the social origin of those recruited into government local organs began to shift). The independent structural effect becomes clear after 1954, from which time the Saigon government was increasingly forced to recruit persons of more humble origin into its local organs. The motivation of these recruits was still weak compared with that of their revolutionary counterparts, however, due to this important structural asymmetry.*

We should note that this same structural difference may be seen from a group viewpoint as well. That is, the leadership of the revolutionary movement, a national structure, was willing to make exchanges with local structures—villages. The Saigon government, however, was unwilling to make this national-local exchange. Consequently, compared with the government, the revolutionary movement gained in its ability to influence local activity and in its degree of national-local integration, while yielding something in autonomy. (This trade-off between influence and autonomy will be discussed in more detail below.)

Here we must hypothesize that the exchanges offered by the Party fit better with popular preferences than those offered by the government. As a result, structures emerged that were not permitted by the exchanges the government leaders were willing to make. These structures were not just duplicates of government structures, staffed by different people; they were *expanded* structures compared with those of the government.

What is the contribution of status to this phenomenon? Status here

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* Party policy similarly dictated increased upward mobility to power positions in the military forces for non-elite groups. The government officer corps was recruited from elite groups because of the educational requirement of the *baccalauréat*; enlisted personnel had little hope of achieving officer rank. In Party military forces, by contrast, officer-level positions were filled directly by promotion of the most qualified men in the ranks.

is much more amorphous than power, the dimensions of which are plain from a structural analysis of Party institutions. We should be clear that status is a separate type of reward from power, though it may co-vary: it is deference and approval from a collectivity for contributions to group goals; it is characterized by both ranking and distance.

Regarding the first element, ranking, the revolutionary movement's "power" vis-à-vis individuals permitted it simply to abolish old forms of deference behavior, e.g., gestures of salutation and terms of address. Beyond this, however, the greatly expanded structures of cooperative activity just discussed undertook redistributive measures that favored large numbers of people within rural villages. These enlarged structures permitted many more individuals to be *associated* with the group-benefiting redistributive effort, even though only in a contributory and not in a decision-making role. Thus, many more individuals could gain group approval through the revolutionary movement than through the government, and this was of course carefully orchestrated by the movement through contests, competitions, award ceremonies, and the like. Combined with this policy was the principle of explicit preference for persons of humble origin as objects of praise. Within the government system the honor ranking was traditionally *si nong cong thuong* (scholar-official, farmer, worker, merchant); within the revolutionary movement the second and third were transposed with the first.

In respect to social distance, too, it is clear that there was a lesser degree of status differentiation within the revolutionary movement than within the government. Party leaders emphasized identification between members of the movement and the general population in terms of dress, custom, speech, and other forms of status differentiation. Since it is well established experimentally that status differentiation impedes communication, we infer that there was a preference for cooperation with the revolutionary movement over the government because of the greater probability of positive reinforcement through community approval. Furthermore, the reduced status differentiation between the movement's operatives and the population had an independent effect in increasing the frequency of interaction.[18]

A third important type of exchange carried out by the revolutionary movement in Vietnam was not "social" at all, but pertains instead to the special circumstances of revolutionary war. I refer here to poli-

cies of protecting certain people in return for their cooperation. As I noted in *War Comes to Long An*, several groups of people were prominent in this exchange issue. The first chronologically were those former Vietminh adherents who were persecuted, either on an official basis or on a personal basis, by agents of the Diem regime. A second significant group were youths who wished to avoid the national draft after its promulgation in 1957. A smaller group consisted of those fleeing government jurisdiction for common crimes.[14]

Starting Mechanisms and a Periodization

One plain implication of this analysis is that non-elites could always improve their position by cooperating to undo their "betters." Since this in fact happens with surprising rarity, we would like to know with more precision when it might occur. Some secular factors will be considered below. Here, however, we can identify some short-run variables that facilitate emergence of revolutionary organizations; conversely, their absence may hinder emergence despite otherwise favorable disposing conditions. At the same time a useful four-stage periodization comes into view: first, a situation of favorable disposing conditions (unequally distributed values); second, the appearance of direct (dyadic) exchanges; third, the phase of emergence, in which indirect exchanges and an authority structure appear; and finally, the phase of goal succession.[15]

The problem is that a successful organization (revolutionary or otherwise) can function only through a complex series of indirect exchanges in which rewards for many participants are mediated by the group and dispersed as social approval. Yet this authority structure is individually coercive only when the group structure actually emerges, i.e., when there is a simultaneous expectation of coordinated group action to realize group rewards. Otherwise, no one may act, despite an objectively favorable situation, since there is no expectation that others will do likewise.

Thus the question is how this simultaneity of expectations may be induced, leading to indirect exchanges. The answer lies in the existence of certain kinds of "starting mechanisms," or more specifically, direct exchanges in which the rewards to the individual are contingent only on his own behavior and not on the simultaneous action of the collectivity. Such direct exchanges are illustrated by the dyad in Fig. 1. Multiple dyads, headed by the same individual, may then (in favorable circumstances) evolve into an authority structure.

The key word here is contingency: whether the reward is so divisible that its receipt depends on individual behavior. This phenomenon of contingency, its function as a starting mechanism, and the special character of revolutionary organizations in the direct exchange (dyadic) phase can be illustrated by events in Vietnam. We might first refer back to the period between 1955 and 1957: the revolutionary organization, in attempting to preserve and rebuild itself,[16] relied to a considerable extent on those seeking *protection* (ex-Vietminh, draft evaders). Slightly later, in expanding into new villages, the movement relied on another contingent exchange: land. This is illustrated by the hamlet of Ai Ngai in Phu Ngai Tri village in Long An.[17] Sometime in 1958 a Party member from outside the village approached Nguyen Van Cu, a poor farmer, offering him land if he cooperated to drive out the Saigon government presence. Cu agreed to cooperate, and thus a direct exchange relationship was initiated in which both parties would be better off if cooperation succeeded. Together they interested several people from other hamlets in the same offer, and thus a number of direct exchange relationships, but not yet an authority structure, developed.

The conclusions we draw are several. First, the mechanism at work here was the divisibility of the reward, which permitted multiple direct-exchange dyads to develop, preparing the way for a solution to the "inertial" problem of lack of simultaneous expectations. Second, if the development of the movement were halted in this phase (by eliminating the reward issues or the leaders of the exchange dyads), it would be more serious than later, since the group structure would not yet have emerged. The third conclusion is that a revolutionary organization is more likely to develop the more there are contingent exchanges, i.e., the more important is protection as an issue and the more divisible are the social values to be redistributed. Conversely, the less there are contingent exchanges, the less likely is a revolutionary organization to emerge (or the more slowly will it do so), despite otherwise favorable disposing conditions. Here we see the peculiar role of land as a starting mechanism: there are many types of distributive inequalities, but land is amenable to individual redistribution in ways that other values are not (e.g., a progressive taxation system or a school building, which are collective goods).[18]

The third phase is that of emergence proper, in which the simultaneity of expectations appears (through the prior working of multiple direct-exchange dyads). In this phase there is an authority

structure, with many individuals cooperating not for material rewards but for the social approval mediated by the group. Once at this point, the movement is much more resistant to assault, not because so many more persons cooperate (though this is true), but principally because the idea of cooperation (i.e., the simultaneity of expectations) exists independently of any individual in the organization. The organization could conceivably be reconstituted from memory; and in fact this is exactly what happened in Vietnam in the late 1950's.

The phase of emergence may be illustrated by pursuing the example of Ai Ngai. During 1960 the government was driven out of the hamlet—by the men noted above, motivated by the powerful direct exchanges previously discussed. The types of exchanges the movement was willing to make were so manifestly beneficial to the community that cooperation led to social approval. Many villagers thus cooperated without receiving the direct exchange benefits that had served to initiate the process. Within two years the number of active participants rose to about 70—far more than the government had ever motivated.

The fourth phase we can identify with this analysis is that of goal succession. Emergence occurred through an expansion from direct exchange, but on a limited number of issues (in which rewards were divisible). The goal succession phase sees the exchanges moving to indivisible rewards, beginning first with such things as a progressive taxation system and the reduction of interest rates, and coming ultimately to innovations with more remote collective payoffs, such as labor exchange and socialization into new work and expenditure habits. Once in the goal succession phase, the revolutionary organization is much more firmly consolidated, since its motivational structure is spread across so many more exchange issues. Furthermore, as the organization expands its activities into new spheres the process of "interlocking" noted by Talcott Parsons occurs, leading to greater stability.[19]

This periodization assumes the "worst case" for heuristic purposes, i.e., a completely atomized collection of individuals having no experience of current cooperation or memory of past cooperation. Even in such a case, new cooperative structures may emerge. However, there is an important alternative route to revolutionary organization: turning existing patterns of cooperation to new purposes. Thus, existing organizations could move directly to the fourth stage of goal succession, reducing or eliminating the need for divisible incentives

to catalyze action. Accordingly, in attempting to predict the likeli-
hood of revolutionary organization in a society, we should also look
at the degree of organizational density, the amount of coordinated
group activity independent of (or in opposition to) authority, or even
the strength of historical memory of such activity. That is, to the ex-
tent that there already exist solidary bonds among a population—of
clan, religious, political, or other types—we expect emergence to be
facilitated.

Exchange, Parties, and Bureaucracies

The discussion thus far has focused on competing military and
bureaucratic structures. When we think of political conflict we ordi-
narily think of a struggle between national political parties. The ab-
sence of such conflict (leading instead to the type of conflict we have
been discussing here) is one of the major anomalies of the struggle
in Vietnam. Consequently, we should shift our attention for a mo-
ment to investigate why political party competition simply was not a
serious element in Vietnam. Here we encounter an example of how
cooperative systems are shaped by group values of political leaders.
This is best illustrated by the problem of political parties in Vietnam.
The examination of this problem is useful not just as an illustration
here, but also because it helps to clarify a more general problem in
the theoretical literature. On the one hand there are those (often
government officials) who argue for civil bureaucracies or military
bureaucracies, or both, as effective mechanisms of rule in transitional
societies;[20] on the other hand there are those, such as Samuel Hun-
tington, who advocate parties, arguing the rigidity and inevitable
breakdown of administrative regimes. It is the purpose of this section
to point out the error of the first position and to elaborate the theo-
retical basis of the second position in a way that its advocates them-
selves have not done.

There appear to be three major "exchange systems" in which in-
dividuals can achieve mobility. First among these is economic ac-
tivity in general, both in the sense that historically it may precede
the other two, and in the sense that in modern noncommunist systems
most individuals operate principally in this exchange system. The
second major system is the government bureaucracy, to include both
the civil administration and the military establishment. The third
broad possible system is that of political participation.

In one frequent formulation these exchange systems are called

"co-optation mechanisms," since in certain circumstances potential revolutionary participants may be so attracted by rewards available elsewhere as not to engage in revolutionary activity (itself one form of political activity). Thus these exchange systems are in some way alternatives to one another, depending on both the terms of trade in each and the volume of exchange available. In our discussion here we will hold the economic system constant and deal with the remaining two systems, which may be expanded much more rapidly and with greater precision than the economic system. We should bear in mind, however, that an alternative to revolutionary participation may have been participation in favorable exchanges in the economic system. Several observers have emphasized how the Diem regime placed obstacles in the way of the expansion of economic activity just as it did in the way of political activity. However, this point will not be pursued here.

Both bureaucracies and political party systems are structures of cooperation in which cooperation improves the value position of the participant. What are the important differences between the two for our purposes? A political party is a cooperative system established for the purpose of giving expression to constituent sentiment. At a higher level, a political party *system* aggregates interests and resolves conflicts. An administrative organization, by contrast, is a cooperative system established for the purpose of command and accountability.

In both cases, however, we are concerned not with the formal goal of the organization, but with the organization's functioning as an exchange system. In particular, how does this functioning relate to search behavior for maximally beneficial exchange relations? The superiority of parties as exchange systems is apparent. First, let us acknowledge that both parties and administrative systems can offer rewards to participants. If the number of individuals seeking improved terms of trade is limited, a bureaucracy may suffice to co-opt them. It is when the number grows larger than the absorptive capacity of the bureaucracy that the weakness of bureaucratic organization as a vehicle of exchange becomes apparent. Here we come to the superiority of party systems as cooptation mechanisms.

In what does this superiority consist? In a bureaucracy both the maximum volume of exchange and the terms of trade are relatively fixed. Thus entrance standards are (ideally) fixed; tables of organization are fixed in size; and the rewards for compliance (security,

salary, promotion, pension) are relatively static. Parties in compari-
son are easily expandable structures of cooperation; that is, there is
no *a priori* limit either on volume of exchange or on terms of trade:
"entrance standards," if any, are easily adaptable; there is no fixed
size; and the rewards may be very great, even for a given size, e.g.,
"capture" of political power, corruption, or redistribution of property.

We should move now from analysis of one party to analysis of a
competitive party system. If such a system is permitted to emerge,
any one party may lose rewards for participants, but the system *as
a whole* amounts to an implicit exchange between the government
and political participants: the government permits the emergence of
systems of cooperative activity (parties, legislatures) that influence
government policy; in exchange the participants "agree" to refrain
from anti-system activity. On the other hand, if the government places
prior restraints on political activity (i.e., is not willing to make such
an exchange), the rewards available through "legal" cooperation may
fall below the level sufficient to bring about the emergence of a com-
petitive system. Potential participants sit by; their efforts are not
even motivated against "anti-system" actions by others. In short, the
emergent structure of legal activity does not emerge. Better yet, from
the point of view of the revolutionaries, an alternative anti-system
structure may emerge.

We thus see that when the demand for access to values exceeds the
absorptive capacity of a bureaucracy, a bureaucracy will suffer in
competition with an expanding structure of cooperation like the revo-
lutionary movement in Vietnam. The "rational choice" in such a
situation, as Harold Hotelling and Arthur Smithies have suggested,
is for the "sufferer" to move closer to the competitor (in physical
terms), or to offer more competitive terms of trade (in exchange
terms).[21] In other words, he should spur the development of co-opta-
tion mechanisms, in our case expandable structures of cooperation
represented by parties and, at a higher level, a party system.

Though this discussion has been framed in terms of coopting in-
dividuals, the analysis might equally be applied to the cooptation of
competing organizations. One of the most intriguing questions in the
comparative study of Communist movements is why some choose a
revolutionary path whereas others remain "domesticated." Our anal-
ysis here suggests that "domesticated" behavior is a rational response
either to the perceived viability of the existing institutional order
(since enough other actors have been bought off to make the revolu-

tionary path unsuccessful) or to the co-optation of the Communist leadership itself. Rex Mortimer's paper in this volume provides an excellent case study of the latter phenomenon.

Why did the Diem regime not pursue such a rational policy of co-optation? Two possibilities suggest themselves. One is that there may have been an *a priori* abhorrence of political party conflict, a consequence of the strong Confucian influence on Diem's political thinking. In terms of our earlier fourfold classification of constraining factors, the values of the principal actors in the Diem regime did not permit this type of exchange relationship to develop even though it would have been beneficial to do so. John McAlister's statement of the consequence is accurate and succinct: "Instead of political mobilization [Diem] saw his major task as political control of such effectiveness that it prevented anyone else from mobilizing power."[22] This is apparent in the regime's behavior toward both the party system and the legislative system. Robert Scigliano, writing in 1963, well summarized the party situation:

> There is from a legal standpoint no opposition party in Vietnam. The approval of the Secretary of State for Interior is required for any political party to function, and his disapproval need not be explained and cannot be appealed. . . . The only parties which have thus far received this approval have been the pro-government groups. All opposition activity in Vietnam is either suppressed, and its participants arrested, as in the case of the communists and a number of too energetic nationalists, or watchfully tolerated, so long as its scope is restricted to small group discussions and the issuance of mild criticisms against the government.[23]

By constitutional provision, statute, or interpretation, numerous restrictions were similarly placed on the legislative system. The National Assembly did not install the Cabinet, nor could it overturn it; it could not alter the budget, nor did it have any post-appropriation control over expenditure; many policy areas did not even come before the legislature but were handled by administrative action. And, in any event, legislative elections were carefully manipulated by the government to produce safe deputies.[24]

This analysis permits us to specify more exactly than is currently the case in the literature just what political leaders must do to bring about a functioning party system as an alternative to anti-system violence. In the most succinct statement of the problem in the literature, Huntington asserts:

Whether a society evolves through a more or less revolutionary path thus depends upon the choices made by its leaders and their urban opponents after the city asserts its role in the political system. At this point either the leaders of the system mobilize the peasantry into politics as a stabilizing force to contain urban disorder, or the opposition mobilizes them into politics as a revolutionary force to join in the violent destruction of the existing political and social order.[25]

What makes the decisions of the political leaders right is more ambiguous. Huntington correctly asserts that it is not holding elections. But "creating organizations" that will "organize participation" and "structure it into legitimate channels,"[26] though excellent as a goal, is not yet a specification of the means. Our analysis shows that the "right decisions" are those that expand the volume of exchanges and improve the terms of trade, leading to the evolution of complex exchange systems between government and party system, between party and party, and between party and party member. A greater volume of exchange leads to stronger integrative bonds, while "organizations" without exchanges remain, as Diem's did, hollow shells.

Because we are dealing with a complex system of exchanges in which some units are actually systems themselves, we may apply this analysis as well to the so-called nationalist parties in the South. These were commonly criticized for failing to present a united front to the Communists, for bickering, for restricting themselves to "tea-room politics," and for failing to go out to "mobilize mass support." Yet it is clear from the values of "nationalist" political leaders that they were not prepared to make the exchanges, as were the Communists, that would motivate the cooperation of poor or landless peasants. As John D. Powell points out,[27] the problem for such groups is subsistence; their margin of safety is small. Political activity is an alternative to subsistence and so will have little appeal unless it provides rewards that are immediate, direct, and guaranteed. Such rewards were available through the types of exchanges the Party was willing to make, but not through the types of cooperation offered by "nationalist" leaders, which centered on symbolic, impersonal, corporate, and universalistic appeals and rewards.

An alternative possibility explaining the failure of the Diem regime to pursue the "rational choice" is a more instrumental one: that the regime sought autonomy for itself and had a genuine fear of autonomy for any other organization. This quest for autonomy, however, was based on a fatal misunderstanding of the relationship between

autonomy and influence, which our exchange analysis will permit us to clarify.

The Diem regime's obsessive quest for autonomy is apparent in its political behavior: abolition of village autonomy, effective elimination of the role of the region and regional delegate, destruction of the power of the sects and the Binh Xuyen, removal of French influence, and abolition of the monarchy.[28] In short, the regime handled the autonomy problem by limiting cooperation, i.e., by throwing legal and extralegal obstacles in the way of all forms of cooperation except those whose rewards were strictly regulated by the regime. Yet as we have seen, organizational power derives from exchange, and exchange implies that *each party has power over the other*.[29] Diem was obsessed with autonomy and therefore became so completely divorced from social forces (i.e., bereft of exchange relations) that his government lost all ability to operate in its social environment. By denying others influence over himself, he denied himself influence over others as well.

This analysis also suggests an important qualification to one frequent view of autonomy in the literature: that it is desirable as an index of "institutionalization." Huntington's presentation exemplifies this view:

> Where the political system lacks autonomy, [new social groups] gain entry into politics without becoming identified with the established political procedures.
>
> . . .
>
> As political participation increases, the complexity, autonomy, adaptability and coherence of the society's political institutions must also increase if political stability is to be maintained.
>
> . . .
>
> If a society is to maintain a high level of community, the expansion of political participation must be accompanied by the development of stronger, more complex, and more autonomous political institutions.[30]

I believe such formulations should be qualified to make it clear that they refer to *autonomy from any one group*, and not to autonomy in general (as one might infer from the passages quoted). Autonomy from any one group derives from successful exchanges with a multiplicity of others. Autonomy in general, Diem's obsession, leads instead to the kind of isolation and collapse suffered by his political system.

Exchange and Secular Development Processes

We have just examined a static theory of exchange that makes revolution comprehensible as a rational act for thinking participants, rather than as the frenzied response of ideological fanatics. What we would like to know, however, in order to amplify the theory, is: why did a revolution occur at this particular moment? It is a puzzling question, for the static analysis just elaborated suggests that the less well off could always improve their situation by collaborating to undo elites.

We should begin with the structure of traditional stability in the South. Three elements stand out here. First, the number of candidates for effective anti-system leadership was limited by the narrowness of educational opportunity. Second, in the political sphere, an effective co-optation system existed, via the mandarin examinations, to absorb into the ruling elite those who might otherwise have gone into anti-system activity. This system provided mobility from villages into the national bureaucratic structure, and it ensured a place even for those who tried and failed the examinations.[31] At the same time, those retiring from the system returned to reside in villages and play an important leadership role there. A third important component of traditional stability was economic redistribution, both by automatic social processes and by conscious policy of the Emperor. The former is the well understood consequence of measures to prevent threats to social solidarity in relatively closed village societies, through various pressures toward economic leveling of the wealthy, e.g., obligatory rituals, feasts, and contributions. Over time the result was considerable mobility—up and down—in village society; at any one time, the result was to mitigate intra-village differentials of wealth.[32] Furthermore, at various times the Emperor broke up for redistribution large landholdings that were accumulated despite local leveling pressures.[33] Thus, the number of those with the mental preparation for leadership was limited; they were effectively co-opted; and one of the programs on which an anti-system movement might have based its appeal—land redistribution—was executed from time to time by the regime itself.

A number of significant changes disturbed this traditional system of stability mechanisms and facilitated a mass movement against the central authority. One was the erosion of the position of the local elites, who were a crucial linkage between the mass of the population

and the central authority. The traditional system provided exchanges with very favorable terms of trade for village elites. Under the existing system of village autonomy, local elites had almost plenary authority, with only a post-decisional accountability to the central government. The latter had only limited functions, in the religious and military spheres. Furthermore, individuals dealt with the central authority only through the medium of their local leadership. The local elites thus were favored in the types of exchanges the central power was willing to make: plenary local authority in return for some limited forms of compliance with the central power (furnishing taxes, corvée laborers, conscripts, and so forth).

The new exchanges between central and local authorities under the French were much less favorable at the local end. Under so-called modern ideas of rationalization of administrative structures, many more responsibilities were placed upon local elites, e.g., for individual tax payment records (with personal responsibility by officials) and for individual census rosters (something never required under the traditional system). This so-called rationalization also called for the separation at the local level of administrative and religious offices, though appointment to religious office was an important part of the incentive for performing administrative duties. In addition, many of the earlier powers of the local elites were no longer endorsed, e.g., certain types of adjudication and punishment. Finally, in response to changing administrative fashions in Saigon, local authorities in Cochinchina were at various periods to be elected, which seriously detracted from the prestige rewards of local administrative roles.[34]

The result of these changes was to diminish the formerly favorable terms of trade the local elites had enjoyed in this national-local exchange. Increased effort was demanded while rewards decreased. At the same time, as Paul Mus and others have pointed out, Frenchmen occupied many of the higher positions in the national administrative system, clogging elite positions and damaging the co-optation mechanism.

The effect, we may deduce, was to erode a long-emergent structure of authority, namely, the village council, as the leadership organ of the corporate village and linkage with the national system. This disintegration weakened the village council both as a potentially repressive weapon again the village population and as a means to co-opt elite candidates into the system. Thus the stage was set for the process described above: potential cooperators might sit by, their energies

not motivated on behalf of the system; or alternatively, with old structures disintegrating, the appeal of forming new structures was proportionately greater, and the risk less.*

Another process occurring here is described by Karl Deutsch as "social mobilization," one consequence of which is the "proliferation of new social forces" elaborated by Huntington.[35] Deutsch defines social mobilization as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior." It is thus a type-concept composed, in Deutsch's formulation, of a number of indices, such as literacy, exposure to mass media, and urbanization. Three components of this process can be neatly integrated with exchange theory.

First, social mobilization places traditional people in new situations where they have new needs. Compliance with the elites was based on their fulfillment of certain needs, but in the changed situation of urbanization and new means of livelihood, the old exchanges may not —probably will not—be relevant, and the earlier forms of compliance will no longer "fit." Traditional stability implies a complementarity of expectations between each actor and all others regarding their respective behavior, a complementarity that is reinforced by the persistence of the objective situation. When this situation is altered, the stability of mutual expectations declines, leading to the type of chaotic, patternless political behavior that Huntington has aptly called "praetorianism."[36]

A second meeting-point between the mobilization hypothesis and exchange theory concerns the consequence of expanding literacy. At the upper end of the scale, expanding literacy may create new elite candidates who cannot be absorbed by existing structures. Thus, there is a growing lack of fit between the structurally permitted volume of exchanges and terms of trade, on the one hand, and the volume and terms expected, on the other. There appears a group intellectually capable of leading an anti-system movement, and with the incentive to do so as well. Lower down on the scale, a similar principle operates among potential followers. In the traditional system the mass of people will be participants in highly unequal exchanges. As literacy spreads, leading to greater equality between elites and masses on this continuum, dissatisfaction appears with the persistence of greater

* It is interesting to observe that the formal rationalization of administrative structures had such a substantively irrational consequence.

inequality on other continua. Along with the dissatisfaction appears the intellectual capability for coordinated group action to do something about the situation. Some empirical studies suggest the individual psychological process at work here: the tendency to behave so as to bring different value dimensions into congruence.[37] Donald Zagoria's paper in this volume also discusses recent empirical evidence on the behavioral consequences for politics of expanding literacy.

A third important interface between social mobilization and exchange theory centers on the role of communication: without communication there could be no exchange. Three components of Deutsch's formulation of social mobilization have implications for communication: per capita income, which is an index of improving physical communication; circulation of mass media; and literacy. As physical communications improve, as mass media develop, and as literacy spreads, it becomes *possible* for new, expanded, complex systems of exchange to develop. Two consequences are plain in the context of Vietnam. First, the simple volume of exchange expands, increasing the amount of power of the system and, *pari passu*, proportionately diminishing the power of existing structures that do not expand (e.g., a centralized bureaucracy, which is limited in its exchange potential for reasons specified above).* Second, from a distributive point of view, entirely new groups of people are now *enabled* to participate in new and far more comprehensive exchange systems. The actual shape of the new systems, however, depends on the kinds of variables mentioned in previous pages.

Another aspect of the social mobilization process worth noting here concerns the shifting nature of the linkages between rural and urban areas, and why in particular the linkages failed as they did in Vietnam. As communications and literacy expand, we expect new groups —particularly middle peasants and small businessmen—to move into local leadership positions, replacing traditional elites. Such individuals have the cognitive competence, the resources, and the extra-village connections necessary to sustain a linkage role. As Powell points out,[38] they are connected to both worlds, and they experience a tension between individual mobility and village solidarity. Which way they turn depends on the type of linkage permitted by the larger structure.

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* The same process explains the decreasing role of individuals and the correlative "institutionalization" of modern life.

Why did such individuals not lead a vigorous "pro-system" effort in Long An, as we might expect them to do? The answer appears to be that under the arrangements perpetuated by the Saigon government in its areas, such individuals could go on making profits under the market system *without exerting leadership in the political sphere* (and ultimately the military sphere). In fact they were not even encouraged to do so by the government; its bureaucratic structure had little absorptive capacity to incorporate new social groups ready for expanded participation. Within the existing structures, furthermore, the burden of risks and expenditure of effort were not rewarded by comparable incentives; consequently, the terms of trade in the exchange did not encourage middle peasants to seek these roles for their intrinsic rewards.

Another set of processes occurring in Long An converge in what has come to be known as the "exploitative landlord" phenomenon. The first general theoretical treatment of this question was Alvin Gouldner's important article "The Norm of Reciprocity." It was posed in its present form by Barrington Moore, Jr.; and valuable empirical work has been done by Robert Sansom and Sydel Silverman.[39] The processes center on changes in the land-labor ratio and in the inputs of the various actors, including both local elites and the central government. The crucial point of convergence of all these processes can be neatly described in exchange theory as the shifting terms of trade between elites and non-elites. Earlier we discussed the secular shift in terms of trade between national and local elites; now we will focus on local elites and those under them.

As noted above, traditional local elites formed an important linkage between the national structure and local villagers. From the viewpoint of the villagers, the local elites performed an important protective function in preserving the autonomy of the village and the anonymity of its members vis-à-vis the outside. The local elites also performed important ritual functions and provided significant inputs to the production process. For these, of course, they were generously rewarded in terms of wealth and status. Even so, there were periodic land redistributions and considerable mobility up and down.

This traditional stable relationship at the local level was upset by a number of changes that took place in the decades following the French invasion. For one, the French policy approach to developing the Mekong Delta, requiring enormous capital investment, dictated that it would be opened up in the form of large estates. In the early

decades of clearing and cultivation this system was both successful and stable, since the elites provided important resources of management, capital, and know-how. A concurrent process, however, was that of population growth (accelerated by French-sponsored improvements in health), leading around 1930 to the exhaustion of new land.

Other important processes were going forward simultaneously. The expansion of the market and general improvement in communications facilitated the growth of extra-village ties; beyond this, local elites came to depend on the power of the central authority for their protection as the government, under the influence of the French "modernizing" reforms, came to depend on village elites for its extractive functions. The result was to attenuate intra-village leveling pressures. At the same time the French-supported monarchy no longer followed earlier leveling practices from the top. Finally, a number of other activities previously performed by local elites began to diminish with the growing differentiation of Vietnamese society: political functions came under the purview of an evolving corps of administrators; military affairs fell to a distinct military force; credit came from an expanding merchant class, and so forth.

The confluence of all these changes was on the terms of trade between local elites and non-elites. In brief, the elites provided fewer inputs to the exchange while non-elites at the same time provided more (as signified by increasing tenancy and rising rental rates). Focusing for a moment solely on the economic sphere, Sansom's evidence indicates clearly that Vietnamese cultivators are economic maximizers, and so they should be sensitive to a changing economic role for the landlord. This is entirely consistent with the evidence in *War Comes to Long An* that economic redistribution was one motivational component in the success of the revolutionary movement.

The changing terms of trade between social groups had two significant consequences. One was the changing subjective characterization of the relationship. Silverman's evidence from Italy indicates a shift from a subjective perception of "collaboration" to one of "exploitation," that is, a decline in the "legitimacy" of the elites; we may infer that a parallel change took place in Vietnam. The other consequence, taken to its extreme in Vietnam, was decreasing cooperation with elites and, finally, armed revolt.[40]

The final dynamic process to be considered here is that explored by Joel Migdal in an as yet unpublished work; the process may be characterized as a growing "crisis of unbalanced accounts" occurring

in a situation of "structural incompleteness."[41] These new elements make attractive certain new exchange relationships.

Migdal's analysis begins with the structure of village stability in subsistence peasant society. Two elements stand out: first, the prevention of outside multiple alliances or even linkages, both by the overlord and by the villagers themselves; second, economic leveling mechanisms of the type I described earlier. In a relatively closed community, social controls against deviance are strong; and the closed character of the village is perpetuated by well-founded fears of uncertainty and exploitation lying outside.

Certain changes destroy the viability of this inward-looking subsistence economy, bringing about what Migdal calls the "crisis of unbalanced accounts": a continuing cash deficit. He here identifies three particularly important changes: population growth; demands for cash to satisfy the state's taxes or the requirements of new production methods; and a decline in cash receipts from handicrafts owing to foreign or domestic competition. Migration and clearing new land are only stopgap measures for the village; ultimately villagers are forced from subsistence production into market production, as well as into labor for cash outside the village. The increasing competition for village resources increases intra-village conflict, and at the same time the developing extra-village linkages lead to a decline in the efficacy of social control mechanisms—both those that support the poor and those that temper the selfishness of the rich. The result is increasing stratification in a situation of "structural incompleteness" (one in which elements are absent that would facilitate the use of market opportunities). This combination favors the emergence of a revolutionary response. In Migdal's words:

> As the crisis of unbalanced accounts results in a greater degree of external relations, peasants interact increasingly with an active network of economic institutions outside the village. What is particularly relevant for the peasants—and especially the less powerful ones—is that this network . . . is fraught with shortcomings: it is marked by corruption and monopolistic practices and is structurally incomplete.
>
> . . .
>
> The hypothesis put forth here is that peasant participation in institutionalized revolutionary movements is an attempt on their part, at least initially, to solve [these shortcomings].[42]

Thus, in Migdal's interpretation, a revolutionary movement is a mechanism for effecting a new integration at a higher level, in keep-

ing with the now shrunken world, to replace the traditional mechanisms of social exchange and social control that had existed in the subsistence village.

Whatever the validity of the secular processes just described, each is a gradual one producing "disposing conditions." Is there any more specific point in time, or any more specific condition, with which the emergence of a revolutionary movement might be identified? Here I think we should refer back to our earlier discussion of starting mechanisms and the importance of self-protection as an exchange issue. Such self-protection often becomes salient in the context of a war against a colonial power and this, it seems to me, has led to considerable confusion in discussions of the role of "nationalism."

In one common presentation nationalism is considered a "general law" of the form "whoever is nationalist gains popular support." It then serves as the major premise of a syllogism explaining the success of some nationalist revolutionary movement. This form is primitive but ubiquitous. Thus, for example: "That side will win peasant support which can demonstrate that it represents the cause of Vietnamese nationalism and the vague aspirations of a new life which form part of its appeal."[43] Or, as another writer puts it: "The French were definitely the 'aliens' and the Communist-led Viet-Minh forces could count on the instinctive support of the native population."[44]

Viewing the phenomenon of "nationalism" in exchange terms shifts our attention from the kind of prerational xenophobia implicit in the preceding quotations back to the realm of rational calculation. This is not to deny an emotive, symbolic aspect to revolutionary behavior; it is only to deny that a disciplined long-term movement can be constructed on this basis alone. Opposition to foreigners may provide value integration that facilitates cooperation, but it does not explain the *amount of effort* expended, that is, why the revolutionary forces fought so much more effectively than the counterrevolutionary forces in Vietnam.[45]

Another important distinction will help to clarify the role of nationalism: that between the ultimate value the group seeks to further and the value of group approval participants gain for furthering that ultimate value. Social approval is what motivates the effort, even though it is approval for contributing to the group goal of, say, nationalism. It is easy to see how an observer might mistakenly believe that the group goal itself is what motivates cooperation, but the distinction between the two values must be maintained, for it is other-

wise impossible to explain how the group continues to function despite shifting means and goals.

My own interview evidence in Vietnam suggesting that "nationalism" was not a motivating factor seems confirmed by Chalmers Johnson's evidence concerning the differences in the Chinese response to the Japanese presence where Japanese policies differed. In the North, the Japanese pursued policies of compulsory labor, indiscriminate violence, and "kill all, burn all, destroy all." In Central and South China the Japanese effort was much more restrained and achieved greater success, leading the Party to observe that "in areas in which the peasants were offered reasonable security by Nanking and the Japanese, propaganda alone was not sufficient to induce them to join the guerrillas."[46]

These points suggest that "nationalism," understood as opposition to invading foreigners, is neither necessary nor sufficient to motivate a revolutionary movement. The mechanism at work in bringing about the emergence of the revolutionary *organization* is instead *self-protection*; it may be one group against another, where both are of the same national origin (the case of Long An); it may be the special "nationalist" case of native defenders versus foreign invaders; or it may be some peculiar variant, such as an ethnic minority versus a dominant majority, all within one national territory—in fact we shall discuss just such a case in the next section.

What is of interest to us is that the urgent need for self-protection is the type of individual contingent incentive peculiarly suited to be a starting mechanism. Once the organization emerges, due to this special circumstance—i.e., once the special pattern of mutual expectations is developed—then the organization, by a process of "goal succession," may shift its activities and its motivational structure into other areas. Thus through this mechanism an organization may rapidly emerge where, despite favorable disposing conditions, it might otherwise have developed only slowly, or possibly not at all. A clumsy invader may restructure the situation such that self-protection becomes important, but a clumsy compatriot may do this just as well.

An Unlikely Case: Northern Thailand

There is hardly a less likely setting imaginable for a Communist-led revolutionary movement than in the jungles and teak forests along Thailand's northern border. Communications are poor; there is little literacy; the residents are so close to primitive cultivation that stratification by wealth has not proceeded very far. Yet just for this reason

events there powerfully illustrate some of the propositions advanced in earlier pages: about the phenomenon of emergence; about the exchange functions performed by a revolutionary leadership; and about the role of agreements that political leaders are (or are not) willing to make. Space limitations dictate a highly condensed presentation of the empirical data; documentation is less than ideally complete also, due both to the sensitivity of the subject in Thailand and to sheer physical problems of research. Considerably greater detail is presented in my article "The War in Northern Thailand."[47]

The northern region of Thailand comprises roughly one-fifth of the territory of the kingdom. It consists of a series of mountain ranges stretching south from Laos and Burma and then bending westward to merge with the long mountain range extending the entire length of the Thai-Burmese border. A series of migrations over the last ten centuries, continuing to today, has populated this region with from 200,000 to 300,000 people belonging to several major ethnolinguistic groups. The diversity among the hill tribes makes generalization difficult. However, it can reasonably be said that distaste toward the upland peoples is the commonest attitude on the part of the valley-dwelling Thai, who consider the upland peoples primitive "savages" of low cultural level and unappealing hygienic practices. This distaste is aggravated by tribal swidden agricultural practices.

There are a number of distributive issues over which the tribal peoples and the Thai are in conflict. First, of course, is the land itself. According to Thai law, the upland areas are royal preserves, and the hill tribes are, technically, illegal squatters. Tribal swidden techniques destroy the forest, another infraction of the law; and the opium grown by some of the tribes is yet a third. A second major source of conflict is that the citizenship status of the tribal peoples is ambiguous at best, and thus they are unable to serve in, much less achieve any kind of mobility through, such government organs as the military, the police, or the civil administration. This total exclusion of tribal leaders from influence in the government has left the tribal peoples defenseless against petty victimization by low-level government officials. There has similarly been no alternative mobility channel through education, since until 1955 there was no system of education for the tribal peoples.* The full potential for difficulty in

* In 1955 the Border Patrol Police began a school program, but the well-intended BPP effort has been greatly hampered by interagency conflicts in Bangkok. In 1970 I interviewed the then best-educated Meo in Thailand—who had completed five years of schooling.

this situation has not been realized because of the limited contact
between the Thai and the upland peoples, the limited education of
the latter, the government's restraint in enforcing the letter of the
law, and, most important, the lack of "power" within the upland sys-
tem itself.

We should devote a moment to this point. It is clear that the Thai
government, through its unwillingness to enter into exchange rela-
tionships with tribal peoples in the spheres of political, military,
police, or bureaucratic participation, forfeited an opportunity to de-
velop influence among them. Yet the tribal peoples themselves did
not possess "power" as we have described it, at least beyond the vil-
lage level. The Meo, for example, the most important tribe involved
in the current violence, were once a powerful kingdom in southern
China. But though the memory of a Meo king has survived through
the twelve centuries since the destruction of their kingdom, until
recently the Meo have not had the supra-village organization that
would have permitted their coordinated action in great numbers.

It was in such a low-power system that the Communist Party of
Thailand (CPT) began recruitment efforts around 1962. Signifi-
cantly, it began with offers, by Thai and Sino-Thai assigned to the
upland areas, for educational opportunity abroad (in Laos, Vietnam,
and China) of a type simply not available through cooperation with
the Thai government. Coupled with this was the offer of a public ser-
vice career in the revolutionary movement. By 1967 the movement
was still in the dyadic phase, with between 100 and 200 activists,
according to government sources, spread in small numbers princi-
pally in the border provinces. At this point, in response to two inci-
dents, a massive and violent government reaction took place, and this
will illustrate for us the phenomenon of emergence.

The first incident was the so-called Opium War in July 1967, in
which the KMT groups resident in the north since fleeing China in
1949 engaged in a rare public brawl over 16 tons of opium. To pre-
serve the fiction that Thailand was being "invaded," the government
sent a number of army units up into the hills. For reasons too compli-
cated to go into here, the tribal peoples engaged these units in some
small brushes, and the army retaliated by napalming and burning vil-
lages, firing indiscriminately with mortars, and forcibly resettling the
hill tribes.

The second incident was actually a series of small engagements
growing out of an assassination, a small attack on a government
militia outpost, and an extortion attempt by police officials. The re-

sult was similar, but in new areas: a violent and indiscriminate reaction that restructured the situation so as to make self-protection an urgent matter. Some idea of the extent of the violence can be gained from the size of the refugee population created: some 6,000 in June 1968, 9,000 in January 1969, 10,000 in mid-1970, and 15,000 in 1972.

Correlating with this massive government assault was the emergence of a true authority structure, in fact an incipient "government," at least in the Meo areas. The number of people taking an active part in the movement, according to government sources, jumped from 200 or fewer in 1967 to more than 2,000 in 1972. At the same time, large areas became "liberated zones" from which the Thai government was (and is) completely excluded. This "void" left in the hills by the Thai government was filled by the first integrated supra-village political and military structure the Meo have had in more than a thousand years. Given the conditions described above, it is unlikely that such a structure would have emerged for a very long time, if at all, without the "starting mechanism" lent by the Thai authorities. The irony of course is that the movement, in cooperation with ethnic Thai CPT cadres, began in turn to put pressure on the Thai communities in the foothills. Indeed, one of the remarkable features of the movement is just this degree of Thai-tribal collaboration. It attests to the power of favorable exchanges to overcome lack of value integration, given the proper catalyst.

This brief example thus illustrates several points. First among these is the phenomenon of emergence, resulting from the peculiarly potent starting mechanism of self-protection. It illustrates again the rationalistic common core of what in the Chinese case was called nationalism: that the mechanism is not emotional opposition to foreigners; the tribal people cooperate well with the "foreign" CPT leaders. A second point well illustrated is the importance for emergence of the kinds of agreements the existing authorities are willing to make. The establishment's discriminatory practices, legal and customary, against the tribal peoples deprived the central government of exchange relations with the tribesmen, and thereby of authority as well, thus recapitulating Diem's quest for autonomy and the resulting self-isolation of his regime. In both cases an emergent anti-system structure was the result. A third point concerns the phase of goal succession. The preliminary findings of studies now being completed reveal that the movement is being consolidated by goal succession into broad literacy training, introduction of sanitation and public

health measures, formation of cooperatives, institution of new agricultural methods, and the like.

My purpose here has been to introduce at least the beginnings of a framework for analysis of revolution that describes both the subjectively rational aspect and the (at least in principle) objectively calculable variables. One important task for elaborating the framework is operationalization of the dimensions and, through further empirical work on various revolutions, a more precise specification of the functional relations involved and of the "prices" of the exchanged values. Silverman's work is a suggestive beginning to the pricing problem. Another important task, as I see it, is the integration of the emotive and inner-psychological aspects of revolutionary participation into this rational-calculating framework. Both individual and group components are relevant here, e.g., early socialization of revolutionary leaders and crowd behavior.

I think one virtue of this framework is that it directs our attention to certain measurable aspects of the real world. Thus "legitimacy" is seen as a function of the terms of trade in exchange relationships, though an important empirical issue here is the extent of the lags involved. We will thus want to look at the structure of exchange networks, and particularly at the absence of exchange bonds between significant actors. An important correlative variable here is the amount of power in the various parts of the system under examination.

Dynamically, we will want to know how the networks are shifting in structure, and how the terms of trade between groups vary. In particular, as new groups appear, what kinds of exchange linkages will they be able to develop? And how do shifts in other variables, such as education, communications, physical mobility, marketing patterns, and technology, affect existing structures and the potential for new ones?

Finally, I would add, this framework emphasizes the volitional aspect of revolutionary emergence: we see revolution as an adaptive response to a particular kind of situation, and whether such a situation exists depends on the willingness of various participants to enter into certain agreements. This is by no means to say that this choice is not influenced by other factors as well. But an awareness of choice itself is important in determining the decisions of participants. Here it seems to me exchange analysis hints that a more just and less violent world is not just a matter of structural determinism.

Toward an Exchange Theory of Revolution

1. Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 3–4.

2. Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

3. Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962).

4. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

5. Blau, *Exchange and Power*, p. 209.

6. Respective references are as follows: George C. Homans, *Human Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961); Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938); Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," *American Sociological Review*, 25.2 (Apr. 1960). For economics the literature is summarized in Peter Newman, *The Theory of Exchange* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965). On the use of exchange analysis in sociology, see Blau, *Exchange and Power*; Blau's entry under "Social Exchange" in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968); and John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The Social Psychology of Groups* (New York: Wiley, 1959). Within political science major citations are Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 5 (1960); R. L. Curry, Jr., and L. L. Wade, *A Theory of Political Exchange: Economic Reasoning in Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968); Robert H. Salisbury, "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 13.1 (Feb. 1969); James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review*, 66.1 (Mar. 1972); and Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 32.1 (Nov. 1972).

7. Blau, *Exchange and Power*, pp. 21–22, 29.

8. Here it seems to me that exchange analysis goes far in clarifying an unexplored insight in the literature: that the amount of power in a system is not fixed but is a significant variable. The discussion in the preceding pages shows power can be "created" through a willingness to enter into exchange relationships. For the development of this insight, see Talcott Parsons, "The Distribution of Power in American Society," *World Politics*, 10.1 (Oct. 1957) ; Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), chap. 13; Frey, "Political Development, Power and Communications in Turkey," in Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963) ; and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 143–45.

9. Blau, *Exchange and Power*, p. 24.

10. See Blau and Scott, *Formal Organizations*, pp. 100–104, for a discussion of this distinction and an example of a measurement technique to separate the two effects.

11. See Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955) ; and Blau and Scott, chap. 5.

12. Robert Sansom, *The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970), chap. 2.

13. See Blau and Scott, pp. 121–24, for a sophisticated discussion of this subject and citations of empirical studies.

14. To put all the incentives I have discussed into Etzioni's typology, those regarding wealth and income were remunerative; those regarding power and status were normative; and those regarding protection were coercive. Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press, 1961), chaps. 2 and 3.

15. For a discussion of this term, see Blau and Scott, *Formal Organizations*, pp. 230–31.

16. Following the Central Committee decision promulgated in the document "The Path of the Revolution in the South." See Race, *War Comes to Long An*, pp. 73–81.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 184–89, plus the microfilm interview transcript cited there.

18. In *War Comes to Long An* this structure was formulated as "contingent incentives." A subsequent review of the literature reveals that many observers (some apparently independently of others) have concluded that this reward structure has significant motivational consequences. See, for example, Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 14–16 ("double contingency") ; B. F. Skinner,

Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Appleton, 1969); Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity"; and Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965) ("selective incentives").

19. Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954), pp. 143–47, 239–46. Katz and Kahn have developed a typology of "institutionalization" that would see a stage of "elaboration of structure" at this point. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 77–83.

20. See, for example, Charles A. Joiner, "The Organizational Theory of Revolutionary Warfare," *Vietnam Perspectives*, 2.3 (Feb. 1967). Joiner's article is actually an approving review of Douglas Pike's *Viet Cong*, another work advocating the organizational explanation of revolutionary success and the usefulness of administrative measures in counterrevolution.

21. Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," *Economic Journal*, 39.153 (Mar. 1929), treats inelastic demand on a one-dimensional continuum; Arthur Smithies, "Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," *Journal of Political Economy*, 49.3 (June 1941), treats elastic demand on a one-dimensional continuum. A sophisticated formal application to politics is developed by Anthony Downs in *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957); this analysis is critiqued in Donald E. Stokes et al., *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966).

22. John T. McAlister, Jr., *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971), p. 330.

23. Robert Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 80. A forthcoming work by John Donnell provides an excellent and more extensive treatment of the problem, especially the chapter entitled "The Government Versus the Nationalist Parties."

24. Scigliano, pp. 40–43, 86, 91–98.

25. Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 78.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 401, 89, respectively.

27. In "Peasants in Politics," unpub. ms., Dept. of Political Science, Tufts University.

28. Scigliano, pp. 31, 32, 62.

29. This is best formulated in Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 27.1 (Feb. 1962).

30. Huntington, *Political Order*, pp. 21, 79, 85.

31. McAlister, *Vietnam*, pp. 22, 240–42.

32. John T. McAlister, Jr., and Paul Mus, *The Vietnamese and Their Revolution* (New York: Harper, 1970), p. 23.

33. Joseph Buttinger, *The Smaller Dragon* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 279–84.

34. For a discussion of these points, see McAlister and Mus, chap. 1; Gerald C. Hickey, *Village in Vietnam* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), chaps. 7 and 8; and Lam Le Trinh, "Village Councils—Yesterday and Today," *Viet My,* 3.2 and 3.3 (June and Sept. 1958).

35. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review,* 55.3 (Sept. 1961) (reprinted in part in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable, *Political Development and Social Change* [New York: Wiley, 1971]); Huntington, *Political Order,* chap. 1.

36. Huntington, *Political Order,* chap. 4 *passim.*

37. Gerhard E. Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review,* 19.4 (Aug. 1954); Irwin W. Goffman, "Status Consistency and Preference for Change in Power Distribution," *American Sociological Review,* 22.3 (June 1957); James A. Geschwender, "Continuities in Theories of Status Consistency and Cognitive Dissonance," *Social Forces,* 46.2 (Dec. 1967); Geschwender, "Explorations in the Theory of Social Movements and Revolutions," *Social Forces,* 47.2 (Dec. 1968). The relationship between inconsistency and action is by no means a simple one, as the studies spell out. Also in point here is Almond and Verba's concept of growing "citizen competence." Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), chap. 7.

38. Powell, "Peasants in Politics."

39. See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), esp. pp. 453–83; Sansom, *Economics of Insurgency*; and Sydel F. Silverman, " 'Exploitation' in Rural Central Italy: Structure and Ideology in Stratification Study," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 3.3 (July 1970). See also McAlister and Mus, pp. 33, 81–84.

40. The most comprehensive analysis of this process is in James C. Scott's article "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia." Scott's study is, as far as I know, unique in explicitly applying exchange analysis to these secular changes.

41. Joel Migdal, "Peasants in a Shrinking World," unpub. diss., Harvard University, 1972.

42. *Ibid.,* pp. 293, 313.

43. Scigliano, *South Vietnam,* p. 159.

44. Bernard B. Fall, *Street Without Joy: Indochina at War, 1946–54* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1961), p. 15.

45. This is the distinction that Etzioni makes between "consensus-spheres" 4 and 5: participation versus performance obligations (*Com-*

parative Analysis, pp. 128–30). It should be emphasized also that this discussion refers only to what Etzioni calls "lower participants," not organizational leaders. An empirical study by Paul S. Berman confirms for the Vietnamese revolutionary movement what other studies have shown about organizations in general: that the motivational structure of higher participants differs considerably from that of lower. Berman concludes that higher participants became what he calls "the committed," such that revolutionary activity became part of their identity and to some extent decoupled from individual rewards. Paul S. Berman, "The Liberation Armed Forces of the NLF: Compliance and Cohesion in a Revolutionary Army," unpub. diss., MIT, 1970.

46. Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 66–67, and chap. 2 *passim*. Lucien Bianco similarly writes: "In relatively peaceful areas (along the Yangtze, for example, where the pro-Japanese Nanking government offered the peasants relative security), the New Fourth Army made little headway and even resorted to destroying the *pao chia* registers and residence certificates to force peasant villagers to oppose the Japanese." *The Origins of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 103 n24.

47. Jeffrey Race, "The War in Northern Thailand," *Modern Asian Studies* 8.1 (Jan. 1974).